

Evidentiary document # 5058.

Evidence taken at SYDNEY before Mr. Justice MANSFIELD
on Thursday 22 November 1945.

Brigadier Frederick Gallagher GALLAGHAN being duly sworn gives the following evidence:-

I am NX70416 Brigadier Frederick Gallagher GALLAGHAN of 27 Bde. My private address is 68 Avenue Road, Mosman, N.S.W.; telephone number X13865. During the fighting preceding the fall of Singapore I was a Lt. Col. Commanding 2/30 Bn. I was taken prisoner at Singapore on 15 Feb. 42. During the fighting prior to the surrender I did not see any Japanese war crimes or atrocities.

I was a prisoner at Changi. On the departure of Maj. Gen. GALLAGHAN I became Commander of the A.I.F. Changi and I remained as such until the Japanese capitulation in 1945. Col. Holmes was in charge of Malayan Command. His actual posting was Commander British Australian Troops Malaya. I was Deputy Commander to him and for the last 18 months I was A/Comd because of his incapacity.

I was in charge of a working party in Singapore and nothing untoward happened until I was involved in the Selarang Incident. On 31 August 42 pressure was brought to bear by the Japanese on us to sign a non-escape form. The Japanese issued an order dated 31 Aug. 42 and numbered 7 which required all prisoners of war to sign a non-escape declaration. On that day they paraded Col. Holmes and the 5 Divisional Commanders who were there, showed the form to Holmes and said they required us all to sign it that day. We had no knowledge of what they were going to ask. Holmes refused on his own behalf to issue the order. It was then passed to each of the Commanders in turn and we each refused to issue an order to sign it. Some discussion took place. It was pretty obvious we were going to have to sign it. We tried to reach a compromise. Their main point was that they were going to shoot anyone who attempted to escape. We said we would promise not to attempt to escape understanding that the penalty was death, and asked them to put that on their printed form, which would be against the Convention. They refused to do that.

After a lot of talk, lasting 2 hours, they refused to make any amendment. They said the form was drawn up in Tokio and only Tokio could amend it. It was phrased, "I hereby promise" or, "I promise upon my honour not to attempt to escape". I took the objection that no soldier has power to promise not to escape. There was no opportunity of escape; it was a matter of principle. It is a soldier's duty to escape, and the Japanese, having signed the Convention, had no right to ask us to sign that.

As we had refused they asked us to give an order to the troops to do it. We refused and they said the whole of the troops must have an opportunity of signing if they wished. That was on 31 Aug.

The main Japanese present at the conference were Lt. OKASAKI, who was a Staff Officer, Col. OKANE and Col. MAKIMURI. The one giving the order was Col. MAKIMURI. Up to then there had been several Jap Staff Officers coming down to see us.

We each put it to the troops and they all refused, excepting one or two British who offered to sign it. No Australians offered to sign it.

On the night 1-2 Sept. we were warned that by 1800 hours the next day the whole of the prisoners of war would concentrate in Selarang Barrack Square. We had to issue orders through the night about it. It was a big move.

At 1100 hours on 2 Sept. the Japanese people called for 4 OR's, two of whom were Australians, Cpl. BREVINGTON and Pte. GALE. The instructions were to hand these 4 men over to the driver of a truck. The 4 men concerned had made an attempt to escape and had been apprehended by the Japanese. I just forget how far Brevington and Gale had got, but they had got a considerable distance and they had been back in Japanese hands since about June 42. They were taken to a camp controlled by the Indian National Army, quite adjacent to the POW Camp. I knew that these two soldiers had attempted to escape, but they had been back in camp so long and particularly as they were in hospital, one never expected anything but the routine thing, which was to take them to the Indian camp for interrogation.

The movement to the Barrack Square was by then commenced. At noon Col. Holmes received an order for himself and his Area Commanders to rendezvous. He had given a subsidiary order to meet him at another spot so we could all go together. Nobody knew what it was about, and we thought the Japs were probably altering their place of incarceration from the Barrack Square, which had buildings, to the beach where we would be without any shade at all. Thinking that is what it was all about I took with me my personal assistant, Capt. N.G. McCauley, and we arrived at Holmes' rendezvous to find they had moved on to the beach, about another three-quarter miles, before we arrived. I got to the beach, reported to Holmes and was informed we were there by Japanese order to witness the execution of the 4 soldiers, including Brevington and Gale.

Okasaki picked us up on the road in his car, about $\frac{1}{2}$ mile from the beach. He was most polite and most friendly and didn't give me any indication as to what I was going to.

We got on to the beach before the fellows to be executed had arrived. Holmes told us that was what we were there for. An interpreter named KORECHU was there. I had a talk with him and asked could anything be done to stop these executions. He replied he was there purely under orders as interpreter, but he could assure me nothing could be done because General FUYUKE had given the orders for execution.

Later 3 of the soldiers arrived by truck from this Indian camp. The fourth man, who had been too ill to go into the Indian camp, had been picked up at our own POW Hospital and he arrived. Three of the 4, including Prevington and Gale, were in pyjamas. Prevington could not stand without the assistance of a stick.

After the 4 soldiers arrived, a truck load of what we called the Indian National Army troops arrived, 10 or a dozen of them, with picks and shovels. In the meantime, the 4 soldiers had been taken near the water's edge and were standing there in the sun without hats. The Indian troops with their picks and shovels were making as much noise with them as they could, thinking they were there for a picnic.

Later 4 more Indian soldiers arrived with an Indian officer named Lt. RAMA. Rama had been a Viceroy commissioned officer in the Indian Army.

Okasaki went to a lot of trouble placing the 4 men to be executed in what he considered the correct position, moving them from one spot to another, and then the spectators were moved around. I gained the impression this was to make the job harder for those watching. Finally the correct spot was selected. They were placed with their back to the sea. The 4 Indians who were the firing party dropped to the kneeling position. Okasaki went to the 4 soldiers and asked them did they want to be blindfolded and they refused that. They allowed the Assistant Chaplain General, Rev. Lewis Bryan, and Padre Watson, one Roman Catholic and one Anglican, both British padres, to talk to the 4. They allowed them about 2 minutes each. There were no RC's there and Watson came back. Lewis Bryan said a prayer with the 4 and then he rejoined the spectators.

The order was then given to the Indian firing party to load. Just at that time, Lt. Rama went to the 4 men. He apparently knew Gale before, because he shook hands with Gale. Subsequently he shook hands with Prevington and then with the other 2, but it seemed obvious to me he went to shake hands with Gale. He came back, ordered the No. 2 Indian of the firing party who was opposite Gale to relinquish his position, took his rifle and knelt down. Okasaki gave the order to fire by handkerchief. The whole 4 were knocked on their backs with the first shot. In my opinion, none were killed. We later thought that possibly the man on the right who was shot through the chest might have been. The men fell in all sorts of attitudes, and as soon as they fell, the firing party continued to fire at them on the ground. They fired possibly 5 or 6 shots when Prevington sat up. He said. "For God's sake

shoot me through the head and kill me. You have only hit me in the arm." He was hit in more than the arm because they hit the whole 4 of them between the legs and in the stomachs. They fired about 10 shots and Okasaki gave the order to stop firing. Each member of the firing party was then moved up opposite the man he had killed, or was supposed to have killed, and they were all ordered to fire 5 more rounds into the body.

Col. Okane came with Okasaki and the interpreter and addressed the spectators. The general gist of what he said is, "These men have been put to death because they disobeyed the orders of the Imperial Japanese Army. The Japanese Army do not like to put to death POW but unless you obey our orders you must be put to death. We cannot understand why you will not order your soldiers to sign this non-escape declaration. You must understand that this is a Japanese order". We had asked, if they wanted us to sign this order, to give us a firm order. If they ordered us to sign, it relieved us of any question of obeying it on our honour. The question was immediately raised, were they ordering us to sign. He said, "No, but you must all sign". Interpreter Koriachu spoke very good English. I did quite a lot of dealing with him. I said, "Look, it is no good. We are not going to sign that unless you order us to do so. You have been educated in England. You know if we are ordered to sign it, we are not bound to obey it." He said, "I think it would be better for you all if you sign. You have seen men put to death."

We were ordered into the trucks and went back to supervise the movement into the Barracks Square.

Prevington and Gale were not tried. I would say that none of the 4 were tried. Later we had men caught for attempting to escape and they did go through some form of court martial, but there had not been any court martial or anything of that nature at this stage.

The movement of the whole of the troops into the Barrack Square was completed on the night of 2 Sept. Selarang Barrack Square has the normal barrack accommodation for a British troops regular unit. It has its store, messes, kitchens, and accommodation for approximately 450 men. There were over 16000 put there.

On 3 Sept. the Commanders were sent for for a further discussion with the Japanese at their own HQ's. Again they asked why would we not obey their orders. The question was asked, "Is this an order? Will you give it to us in writing?" They said, "No, but it is an order." He said, "Yes, but we have our duty to perform, and unless you can give us this in writing - and if you do that, we do not consider it binding, anyhow - we do not propose to obey any of your instructions in this regard." They then allowed us to leave. From then, in the next 2 or 3 days, we were in frequent conference with Col. Okane, who was always accompanied by Okasaki who was staff officer to the General. Okane tried to point out to us the futility of what we were doing. He said he had been in many campaigns and had had a staff appointment in the last war when we had been allies, and he felt we were doing no good and would we please sign. He got a further refusal, but we again discussed with them the question of amending

the form, but they refused to consider any compromise or alteration to the form.

Apart from the conferences with the Japs, the Commanders were in practically continual conference during the whole period. The health of the troops in the Square was becoming an important factor. There was an alarming increase in the number of dysentery and diphtheria cases and to have remained in the circumstances much longer would have meant the loss of most of the people who were there. About midnight we had a conference and decided, to save life, it would be better if we agreed to issue the order. We retired for the night on that decision.

Early the next morning, Okano came again to see us. It was apparent during this conference that the Japanese were very worried and instead of adhering to our decision of overnight, we continued to ask them to amend this form or give a firm order. He went away to see Gen. Fuyuke and later, on returning, said that they would issue an order. They asked for the return of their order, No. 7, which was dated 31 Aug. It came back later with another order, which didn't say that we were to sign of our own volition but ordered every POW to sign this form. That was also dated 31 Aug. and was numbered 7. It was pretty clear it was a trick, but at that stage, we saw no point in raising that.

Col. Holmes immediately made a declaration to the effect that the order No. 7 dated 31 Aug. had been withdrawn and substituted by this further order. We also had a copy of the original No. 7 order made and had that attested to.

During the period we were in the Barrack Square no rations whatever were allowed to be supplied to the POW and Fuyuke had given an order that no rations were to go to the hospital. At first, it was decided to put all the patients in the hospital into the Square. We made representations about that and he subsequently allowed the hospital to remain, but he issued an order that no food was to go to the hospital or the POW incarcerated in the Square. The hospital got food because of the deliberate misunderstanding of the Japanese order by Capt. James, of the British Army, who was interpreter at Japanese HQ's. He was told in Japanese to send the hospital truck back to Singapore and he misunderstood that and sent them to the hospital. His reward for that from the Japs was that they thought about executing him, but nothing happened.

As the order had been issued with the Japanese signature on it ordering us to sign the form, we proceeded to order the various formations. As the Australian Commander, I could not, in the circumstances, accept Col. Holmes' order to do so, and I issued my own order that all Australian troops would sign the form. Before doing that I addressed them, explained the whole of the negotiations, and expressed the opinion that the mere fact of making the Jap change his mind over the issue of the order, was, to me, a moral victory.

They then allowed us to resume our normal quarters, but the following day took away quite a considerable amount of the accommodation. Even so, we could not complain about the accommodation as it was quite adequate.

Gen. Fuyuke himself did not come into the negotiations personally. In the Japanese Army, no matter what the business might be, you never, at any time, see a Japanese General. Order No. 7 was signed by Okasaki, Japanese Staff Officer for Fuyuke.

I don't know of any other specific atrocity in the way of executions or mass punishments of that kind in which I was personally concerned, but, prior to my taking command, the Japanese informed us that a number of Australians had been executed for attempting to escape. That was about March or April 42. I know 1 or 2 of the men shot came from 18 Bn. They informed Australian HQ that these men had been executed and gave their names.

We were able to save the diphtheria cases caused by the Selarang Square incident. It is difficult to say in the dysentery cases as they would go into hospital, and whether any deaths were caused in that regard by the Selarang incident, it is hard to say. No one actually died on the square. We were not allowed to evacuate anyone to hospital from the square. We were forced to keep all the contagious cases there. As far as the A.I.F. was concerned, we did take in a medical team. We had a hospital of sorts there to treat them. The senior MO was Col. J. Glyn White.

The food issued by the Japanese in Changi camp was never sufficient. It commenced to decrease from the middle of 42, and it became practically a starvation diet. Without the use of money obtained by commandeering officers' pay and a small amount from the troops, and growing our own vegetables, it would have been impossible for anybody to have lived on the food. In my case, I was 15 stone, and in the years, 1942-3-4, I was 9 stone 2 lbs. I know of a case of a man of 16 stone dropping to 4½ stone. That was practically general. Everybody would be at least one third under weight.

Diseases occurred which were attributed by the medical officer to malnutrition. Many got beri beri. Also it was necessary to eat potato tops and a green weed called "byem". Byem is a very fibrous weed. It is comparatively pleasant with rice. On account of the fibre in it it caused considerable damage to the intestines. It caused a lot of stomach trouble. I attribute a lot of the duodenal ulcer cases that we dealt with to the diet. We got a number of cases of pellagra, which is malnutrition in an extreme form. In the end we had approximately 300 Australians in a special malnutrition ward. They were the men who had lost weight badly. The MO in charge of that ward was Major Bruce Hunt of Perth. We were trying very hard to augment the

food, but even with the augmentation we did arrange, Major Hunt told me I could anticipate a very great number of them dying in the next 4 weeks. That is just immediately prior to the Japanese capitulation.

The food, plus the living conditions, brought on a considerable amount of skin trouble; dermatitis, scabies, things like that. The Japanese provided us with very small quantities of drugs. In the years 1942-3 we got 2 lots, one in each year, but it was totally inadequate. They told us they could not obtain quinine or atobrin themselves and that they could not obtain certain other medical supplies. When the capitulation of the Japanese came, we discovered in Singapore a factory making the very thing we had been crying out for for years.

I think they could have supplied us with more rice. We had sufficient rice in stock to see us through to January next year when they capitulated, on their scale of issue. I think they could have issued us with more fish. That is plentiful about the place.

Up to about March this year their own troops were far better supplied than we were, but from March this year onwards, they were on exactly the same rations as we were, but the Japanese soldier had an opportunity of buying, which was not available to us except through a Japanese canteen. He could go into Singapore and have a meal of fowl, if he had the money.

Lack of protein was our main trouble. We started our own gardens, which were subsequently extended, with their permission, to 120 or 130 acres. We laid it out and it became a very good show. Early 1943 or late 1942, one of the visiting Japanese Generals saw it and thought it would be good for propaganda and they took it over. From then on they controlled the garden, although we were still the technical advisers. Amongst other things we had planted were several thousand paw paw trees. Just as the paw paws were coming ready for use the Japanese confiscated them all. We explained we were only growing paw paws for hospital patients. They said it was General Sato's order that they be supplied to the Japanese. The lad in charge of the garden was a Korean whose name I forget. He spoke very good English. We told him the number of really seriously ill patients we had in hospital and he arranged to give us paw paws for those patients. The rest they took and distributed amongst the Japanese officers.

Until we moved to the Changi Gaol area the accommodation they supplied us was generally reasonable, but at times it was most unreasonable. At one period we had over 10,000 who remained in the Changi area and we were most overcrowded. At one stage in my own unit we had a barrack block which normally accommodated the usual Coy. Commander's office and QM Store and 150 troops and we had 998 in that block. With the movement of forces from early April 1943 the accommodation was there in space, but that was all. In a house occupied by a British officer and his family we would have to put 150, very closely

packed together. Each man would only get 18 inches of space, but he would have space to lie down. However, the ordinary kitchen in the house would be useless. Our main trouble was the cooking. They gave us nothing in the way of kitchen gear. We had to scrounge all that ourselves. The Japs issued us with no messing gear or anything to assist us in cooking. However, we had officers in the area who were permanently stationed there before the war and they could tell us where certain things were, and we either got Japanese permission to get them or just took them. Then we asked for messing or kitchen utensils from the Japs, it was useless unless we could say we knew where they were in Singapore. The POW organisations would let us go and get the stuff but we were never issued with any.

All POW were concentrated in Changi Gaol and an area outside the gaol. The number in the gaol was 5800 and it went down to 3000. The gaol was built to hold 600 personnel, 550 Asiatics and 50 Europeans. That move took place in May 1944. We had built an aerodrome for the Japs at Changi. The Air Army said they wanted the whole of a certain area without any POW and the POW had to get out. Had there been severe attacks on the aerodrome we might have lost troops, but I am of the opinion that the move was only just another instance of "bloodiness".

On the credit side of that move, they moved the civilian internees out of the gaol and we were quite happy over the move on account of that. There were some 3 to 4000 civilian internees, amongst whom were over 1000 women. These women were incarcerated in one portion of the gaol and for some months they were never allowed out of the gaol. Then they were allowed out of the gaol for a swim. The conditions they lived in were frightful. We were quite happy about that move because it meant they were moving into better quarters in Singapore.

For 2 years the Japanese gave us no boots or anything to repair the boots we had. Then they decided they would repair boots for us. We asked that they not attempt to repair them but that they give us the leather. They did that for a period, although never in sufficient quantities. Later they decided they would get the boots repaired for us to do that they had some natives working for them in Singapore. There was some propaganda in the fact that these people were repairing POW boots. For a period they compelled us to hand the boots to them for repair. We never received back one tenth of the boots sent in for repair, so we decided not to send them in but to repair them ourselves with rubber from tyres or a locally made rubber. We repaired the boots with those. They issued a few Japanese rubber boots but there would not be one man in 20 get a pair. In the first half of 1943 and the whole of 1944, 9 out of 10 of the men going to work would be wearing wooden clogs which we made in the camp ourselves. When the capitulation came they issued sufficient boots for 1 pair per man, but not in the right sizes. They were all Japanese boots of small sizes.

We had sufficient clothing given us on 16 Aug. to make an issue

of at least 1 singlet and 1 pair of Japanese-made shorts per man, but in all the years before they told us they didn't have any.

They always promised to give us hats, but they never did so. As soon as the show was over they were able to issue us with khaki drill hats from our own stores which they had all the time, but had not issued to us. When the war was over the Japs issued boots, shorts, and singlets and some British-type hats.

The biggest task the men had was the job described by the Japs as ground-levelling. We had not been doing it very long before it took on the appearance of becoming an aerodrome. That job involved two to three miles marching, and working for nine hours. The men were away normally for 10½ to 11 hours. The Japanese, not the Koreans, were the work supervisors. They were particularly harsh and very brutal. At this stage General ANIMURA was in charge.

Representations were made to him on the score of brutal treatment, long hours, and hard work, brought a little alleviation. That, I think, was the biggest job, because it was a continuous job taking a whole year. At the time the men had no boots and no clothing. We reached the stage of having to withdraw every pair of boots from any man at all in hospital or doing any indoor job, thereby permitting men going out to work to have some boots - some of them, anyway. From January this year the number of parties all known as X-parties were distributed all over Singapore, and two of the parties at Johore Bahru, capital of Johore, were employed in digging Jap defences; and in several camps men worked as long as 14 hours a day. I cannot give you any information as to those camps - I am only quoting from verbal and written reports furnished to me later. There was another party which went away early in March 1942 to a place called Plakang Mati. They were under the command of Major Oakey, of 2/18 Bn., and they remained there until the capitulation. They had a very bad time for the first year or 18 months, but again I cannot quote from my own knowledge. I suggest that Major Oakey might be able to assist you there. They did carrying and stacking of bombs. In that camp, one man was drowned.]

Captain F.E. Stahl, from Brisbane (probably in Victoria now) was in charge of one of the very bad camps; Captain Walker of the 26th Bn. was in charge of the worse of the two camps at Johore Bahru. Captain Duffey of 2/30 Bn. was another of our officers at that camp.

I saw Jap military planes using the aerodrome when it was built.

There were no visits by anyone at all interested in our welfare. There were many inspections by high-ranking officers but never anybody we were allowed to talk to. There was no visit by any representative of the International Red Cross. We made repeated requests but nothing was done. In the early days of 1942 our own Red Cross representative

was permitted to go to Singapore to talk to Mr. Schweitzer, the International Red Cross delegate, to arrange advances of money for the purpose of getting drugs and medicines, but at the end of 1942 this permission was withdrawn. From the day we went there requests were made for the International Red Cross delegate to visit the camp. I continued until the end with this request but it was never granted. I have since talked with Mr. Schweitzer and he tells me that he himself was under surveillance, and that he had his face slapped on a number of occasions.

The Japanese made demands of certain numbers of men to work. The most you could hope for by representations was a compromise as to the number. It frequently necessitated sending out fit men to work for the Japs and putting the less fit men on work within the camp itself. For instance, the Japs did not ever regard cooks as either necessary or as hard workers, and for a long time for the first three years they did not recognise cooking as work. What we did was this - we combed out the orderly room and light duty personnel and put them on to work. Finally we reached the stage where everyone working in the camp itself was actually unfit to work, and a proportion of the men proceeding to work were to a minor degree unfit for that work. But we would rather get our sick men working under ourselves and put the others out to work. Because of the Japanese order, sick men were working inside the camp.

The Japs actually made numerical demands for labour which could not be filled without making sick men work in the camp.

In representing this to the Japs I always said that there were no men in the camp fit to work, and pointed out that working on the meagre rations and under the living conditions provided was an offence against the Convention. I did all of the representations in these cases. I always warned the Japs that when the war was over we could not forget it all.

We maintained that nobody was fit to work.

Rolls of prisoners and casualties were supplied to the Japs within the initial six weeks, or about that time. They were supplied to the Japs once through my own command; and on another occasion Captain Thomas, who had been their interpreter, was being sent to Tokyo and he took a set of separate rolls of prisoners and casualties. I have spoken to him on the telephone since, and he said he had delivered them in Tokyo, and he wondered if they ever got back to Australia. From time to time the Japs were given advice as to our casualties, as a routine matter.

During the whole period we were permitted to send four postcards with 25 words on. The last one was either June or July this year. In addition, Australian prisoners were allowed to send during 1943 one broadcast message home. At that time I had 10,000 men under me, and the

whole 10,000 messages were demanded at one and the same time. The result was that although the Japs used four broadcasting stations, people in Australia received wireless messages from their next-of-kin who in one instance had been dead nine months before the actual date of the broadcast message. It took the Japs about 18 months to send the messages. Of those four to five written messages which I sent, two reached my people.

I personally received 51 communications from Australia. Some were better, and yet a number did not receive any. The whole Jap system of receipt and despatch of mails was an impossible one. We were getting letters for men who were in Korea and elsewhere, and doubtless they were getting ours. First mails for prisoners, British and Australian, came to Singapore, and we requested and received permission to sort the mail into proper bundles. These we handed to the Japs for distribution.

We bundled it for Burma, Thailand, Japan and Burma. We put a label on front where it was to go - yet we still got some of those bundles back in 1945. Their system of distribution was quite hopeless.

For the first seven months, the command of the prisoners of war on Singapore Island was under Lieut. (later Captain) OKASAKI. About late July or early August the first General was appointed - he was Major-General FUKUYE. When Fukuye came the camp commander was firstly Okasaki. There were five in succession, including Okasaki. Others were TAZUMI, TAKAMISHI, and MURA, and another one whose name I forget. The Major-General issued orders along the normal military channels of communication but very frequently the General Staff officers would proceed to POW HQ and issue orders also, which probably the camp commander or commandant would not know until we told him. Fukuye was GOC PWs in Malaya and Sumatra. He was succeeded by General ARIMURA, followed by General SAITO.

I understand that their chain of command went to Tokyo, and not through the normal military chain of command so far as things concerning prisoners of war were concerned. It was competent for a combatant General to demand prisoner of war labour and it was competent for the general commanding PWs to reject that. It was competent for the General commanding PWs to lay down terms of work and hours. I know that, because on one occasion we were representing the question of brutalities on the aerodrome. The then camp commandant Takahashi took the matter up with General Saito and the result was that an order was issued that no prisoner would work for the Japs next day. Incidentally, that stood until 1000 hours, and then another order came out that they had to start work. Another time when a complaint was made they were given a holiday next day. So the General commanding must have had some control over prisoners, where he could resist the orders of the combatant General.

There was a GOC Singapore named ITAKAKI. His headquarters was Raffles. He commanded Singapore and portion of Malaya as combatant

General. He was under TERAUKI. He was responsible for the operational side of Singapore, and carried that responsibility over us. General Saito would deal direct with Tokio. I do not know Saito's immediate superior in Tokio.

I personally know Fukuye, Arimura and Saito.

I regard Fukuye as the most inhuman man I have ever seen in command of troops. Arimura I do not think had any sins of commission; it was just that he was an old man obviously brought back from the reserve and took his job very lightly. Saito - there are no instances of brutality by Saito himself. He in my opinion was the best of the three. When our representations did get to him, actually through his own staff, he would always either act or send back and say that he was not going to do it or would not do it.

Fukuye never saw prisoners in their own quarters. I do not remember him ever being on his feet in the camp.

Arimura frequently rode round the camp in a car; he spoke English very well and on a number of occasions talked to prisoners.

Saito was round the camp at least three times a week.

I regard them in that order as criminals - Fukuye, Arimura, Saito.

The five camp commandants were carrying out orders. In no instance except that of Takahashi did I know of any of the camp commanders attempting to punish prisoners of war. The other four would always go and rattle their swords and say, "We'll leave it to you". In Takahashi's case, he punished them himself.

We have cases where Takahashi handcuffed a couple of Australians and as far as he was concerned they stayed like that for a week. But we had a skeleton key to the handcuffs and took them off at night. He himself would not take them off or give permission to let them be taken off. He sometimes saw what he considered was an offence and would clap a man into gaol. On another occasion he handcuffed a British chap to the iron gill of his cell. The handcuffs were on like that for days. He was the only camp commander who ever awarded punishments himself - the others, well, none of them were really difficult to get on with. They were doing their job and they had their orders. On the question of numbers of men required for work, Tazumi gave us a very reasonable hearing. Once I discussed the matter of physical fitness; he pulled out of his drawer a graph showing the situation as I had it; he was in a position to discuss it. He would always compromise. The only one that I regard as a nasty type was Takahashi - yet you will find that most prisoners will say he was a good man. They did not know him. He paid me the compliment of saying once that he would not deal with

me any longer - that I was far too arrogant. He introduced a Colonel named Newey, an Englishman. Against orders Newey accepted the job of representative officer - for which he has been placed under arrest and will be court-martialled at home. Takahashi introduced Newey. The result was that although Newey was bad, the troops did not realise that Takahashi was behind that move, and that it was not done for the benefit of the prisoners of war. Of the camp commanders, the only one I regard as indictable is Takahashi.

The average Jap soldier that we saw in the central administration was not the people who committed the offences. They were the Japs out with the work parties who were brutal. Of course, you got the odd bashing or two within the camp. But they were cases where you could actually nail the Jap responsible and within a couple of minutes you could protest, pinning him. Generally speaking, the camp commanders reacted very favourably to this question of hitting prisoners.

Some guards have had a few hits at me but probably I think as face-savers. I personally at one stage had 40,000 men that saved me from hitting. They once beat up my interpreter for saying just what I said - he was a chap named Pavey, a British man. That also was face-saving on their part. It was, they felt, safer to hit him, and not me.

When we got orders for F Force to move, the matter was the subject of a conference with the Jap commander, at that time, I believe, Tazumi. I asked where these men were going to work. I do not think he answered that day. No, he did not. He said he could not answer that question. Subsequently - next day - he said they were not going to work. Then on the question of the type of work and the numbers required, we were told that the men were going away to new camps, to a place where food was much better, and the men would not have to work. Tazumi told me this. Then the number of fit men was not enough. The matter was referred to the camp commander, who said we could include 30 per cent of sick. That raised the doubt as to what the men were going to do. Again Tazumi was asked about it. He said they were not going to work; that they would have a canteen and that we could send up our doctors and have our own hospital. He said, "It will be a camp just like this, except that you will not be in this type of building but in country where the climate is better and the food plentiful."

Count Terauchi inspected us twice. Once some Jap royalty came, but we were not permitted to look. Tojo once was in Singapore but never came out to see the prisoners.

As far as we were concerned, these inspections were not inspections of us or our quarters. We called them 'gloat parades'. We were lined up on the road and a couple of truckloads of armed Jap soldiers came along, then a car with six men armed in the back, then a big motor car with a high personage in it, followed by many other armed cars. Nobody ever walked about the camps. In July this year,

Evidentiary document # 5058.

14.

Itagaki came out and was the first and only Jap who ever did this - he went to see the hospital; he actually stood at the corner of the road and the hospital was pointed out to him. The Japs had ordered an officers' party, and I went among the 20 to 30 officers in the hope of being able to say something.

But he did not look at us, although obviously we had been sent there on somebody's orders.

I certify that the above evidence is true and correct.

(Signed) F.G. GALLAGHER.
Brigadier.

taken and sworn before me at)
Sydney on Thursday 22 November 1945.)

(Signed) A.J. MINTFIELD.
Commissioner.

証言書類第...八號

Doc 5058

フリードマン・クラーク・カシガニ、代將、正式に宣誓、上次、證言ヲナス
..... 余、一九四三年、昭和十七年、二月十五日、新嘉坡ニ
於テ俘虜トナリ、..... 余、サヤギ、俘虜デナリ、カシガニ、少將ト立
ト同時ニ余、サヤギ、濠洲軍歩兵隊指揮官トナリ、一九四五年、昭和二十年
、日本降服迄、任ニワタ、ホルムズ、大佐、馬來司令、任ニワタ、同大佐、
實際、職務、馬來英軍司令官デナリ、余、其、副司令官デナリ、
が最近十ヶ月間同大佐、不遠格、爲司令官代理トナリ、.....
一九四三年、昭和十七年、八月二十日不逃亡誓約書ニ署名セヨト我々ニ曰
本軍、う左迫、加ヘラ、日本軍、一九四二年八月二十日附第七號、
命令ヲ發シ、之ヨリ不逃亡誓言ニ署名スルヲ俘虜全員ニ要求シ、
テ、.....、曰、彼等ハ、ホルムズ、大佐、及ビ所在、立名、師團長、
列セシ、ホルムズ、ニ書式ヲ示シ、我々、全員ニ、曰、之ヲ署名スルヲ要ス、
我々ハ、彼等ヲ要求セシトシ、サヤギトニ就、テ、金銀、知、サヤギ、ホルムズ、
ハ、右命令ヲ出スコトヲ自ラ拒絕シ、.....、右書式、師團長、
ニ與、シ、我々、夫々、右書式ニ署名、サヤギ命令ヲ出、テ、署名、
若干、議論、起、サヤギ、我々、署名、ス、コトハ、相当、ハ、ナリ
ニ、サヤギ、我々、ハ、セ、協、到達、シ、我々、多、彼等、主、眼、トス、ル、コトハ、逃
セ、ト、シ、者、誰、サヤギ、射、殺、ス、ル、ア、フ、我々、ハ、刑罰、カ、死、デ、ナ、ル、ト、
了、解、シ、ウ、逃、テ、ウ、試、ミ、ス、コトヲ、約、ス、ト、セ、ロ、ベ、シ、我々、ハ、印刷、書式ニ
書、キ、入、ル、様ニ、要求、シ、テ、而、レ、バ、之、ハ、條約ニ、及、ス、ル、モ、テ、ア、フ、我々、新、嘉、坡、
.....、ニ、時、同、ニ、立、ル、論議、後、彼等、何
等、修、ビ、ウ、モ、テ、ス、コトヲ、拒、否、シ、テ、我々、ハ、其、書式、示、ス、於、テ、作

No. 1

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成カータモリデアリ、東京・ミカエラ修び、得ルモリデアルト云フクソニハ
私に誓約ストカ、私ハ私ノ名譽ニシテ逃テ全因ヤサルコトヲ
誓約ストカ、言フガワツタ。余ハ兵ハ推テ逃テスルヲ誓約スル權
能デイト及テ、逃テ、機會ハ無カワツタ即チハ主義ノ問題デ
アワツタ。逃テスルハ兵ノ義務デアル。而テ此ノ條約ニ署名シタ
日本側ニハ、其ノ書ハニ署名スルコトヲ我ルニ要求スル權利ハ無カワ
タノデアル。

我々が拒絶シタデ彼等ハ兵隊ニ之ヲス様命令ヲ與ヘヨト要求シタ。我々
ハ拒否シタソデ彼等ハ軍隊全員ニ若シ希望トアラバ署名スル機會ヲ
得ラレル様ニシテヤラネバラスト言フタ。ソレハ八月三十一日コトデワツタ

九月一日カラ二日ニ亘ル夜、我々ハ翌日十八時迄ニ停虜全員ハセララン。バラ
ック・スフェアニ集結スベシト豫告サレタ。我々ハ之ニ關シテ夜中命令
ヲ出サネバトラカワツタ。之ハ大移動デワツタ。

九月二日十一時、日本人ハ四名、兵隊ヲ呼ビ出シタガ、内二名ハ濠洲人ノガ
レイントン兵長ト、ゲイル兵士デワツタ。指令ハ此等四名ヲトラクノ運
転手ニ引渡スコトデアッタ。右四名ノ者ハ逃亡ヲ企テ、日本兵ニ捕縛サレテ
タノデアル。余ハ、ゲイル兵士ト、ゲイルガ何處迄逃ゲタカ一寸失念シタガ、彼
等ハ可成、距離ニ達シテワツタモデ、彼等ハ一九四二年六月頃以來日本人ノ手
ニ歸シテモリデワツタ。彼等ハ停虜收容所ニ至テ、印度國民軍ガ
管理シテモリタ收容所ニ收容セラレタ。余ハ此等四名ノ兵ガ逃亡ヲ
企テタトハ知ワレタカ、彼等ガ永ラク收容所ニ歸ワテヨト特ニ彼等ヲ入
院シテモリタ。誰モ彼等ヲ訊問タメ、印度收容所ヘ連行ストイフ普通
ノ事以外ハ豫期ニカワツタ。
バラック・スフェアニヘノ移動ガ其ノ頃ニハ始マラニテナク。

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正午、ホールズ大佐、同員及、其、麾下ノ地ニ指揮官指定地集合ノ
命令ヲ受ケタ。同大佐ハ他ノ地ニ於テ彼ノ命令ヘキ補足命令ヲ出シテ、
ソレヲ其ノハ全員ニ達シ行、ワットガ出来タ、一休何ノコトカ誰モ知ラカッタ。
ソシテ我々ハ日本軍ガ此ノク彼等ノ監禁場所ヲ建物ノアル「バウク、
スラエー」レカラ我々ガ全ク日蔭モ無シニル様ナ海濱ニ替ヘルダト我々
ハ考ヘタ。之ガ本件ニ因スル全部ダト考ヘ、余ハ余ノ個人的補佐、
タル「エヌ、シ」マツコウレイ大尉ヲ帶同シ、我々ガ「ホールズ」レニ
集合地ニ到着スルト、我々ノ到着前ニ、更ニ約四分ニ哩先ノ海濱ニ彼等ハ
既ニ移動シテタ。余ハ海濱ニ到リ「ホールズ」レトコロヘ出頭スルト、
我々ハ日本ノ命令ニ依リ「ブレヴィントン」レ及「ゲイル」レヲ各々四名ノ兵士
ノ死刑執行ヲ目撃スル為ニ「コナル」ダト知ラサレタ。

我々ハ死刑ニサレル者ガ来リ前ニ海岸ニ着イタ。「ホールズ」レハ我々ガ其処
ニ来リタル目的ハソレナダト言ッタ。「コレ」レト云フ名前ノ通譯カ来リ居タ。
余ハ其ノ通譯ト話タシ、此ノ死刑執行ヲ止メサセル為ニ阿トカ出来ナイカト
タツネタ。同通譯ハ其處ニ就然タル通譯トシテノ命令ヲ受ケテ来リ居ル
「ゲイル」ト答ヘタガ「フエ」レ大將ガ死刑執行ノ命令ヲ出シタ「ゲイル」カラ、
何トモ出来ナイと定ッテ「ゲイル」ト請ケ合ッタ。

No. 3
暫ラクシテ、此ノ印度軍ガ管理シテタ收容所カラ貨物自動車デ兵
隊ノ中ニ人ガ到着シタ。重態デ印度軍收容所ニ入レラレカッタ四人目
ノ男ハ、我々ノ俘虜病院カラ運レテ来ラレ、到着シタ。四人ノ中ニ人ハ、
其中ニハ「ブレヴィントン」レト「ゲイル」レモ入ッテ居タガ「パヤマ」レヲ着テ居タ。
「ブレヴィントン」レハ杖ノ助けガ無クハ立ツトモ出来ナイカッタ。

四人ノ兵隊ガ到着シテ後、貨物自動車ノ台ノイ人カヤ人程ノ所謂

slac 5058

印度國民軍が鷓鴣ヶ「シヨベル」ヲ持ッテ到着シタ。其ノ間ニ四名ノ兵隊ハ水際ニ連テ行ケレ、其處デ帽子モ被ラズニ日ノ当ル中ニ立ッテ居タ。鷓鴣ヶ「シヨベル」ヲ持ッテ印度人部隊ハ、此處ニ遊山ニテモ来タと思ッテ力、其等デ来ルダケ喧シイ者ヲ立テテ居タ。

其ノ後「ラマ」中尉ト言フ印度人將校ト共ニモウ五人ノ印度兵カ到着タ。ラマハ印度軍中ノ總督將校デアル者デアル。

岡崎ハ刑ヲ執行サレル四人ヲ正シト思フ位置ニ立タセルマデ、アヤコト勅カシテ盛ニ苦勞ヲシタ。其レカラ傍觀者モイデテ移動サセラレタ。之ハ見テ居ル人達ニ其ノ仕事ヲ困難アモトサセル為ニシテ居ルダト言フ印。家ヲ私ハ受ゲタ。終ニ正シイ場所カ選バレタ。彼等ハ海ニ背ヲ向テテ立タサレタ。死刑執行部隊ノ四名ノ印度兵ハ膝ヲソック姿勢ヲ取ツタ。岡崎ハ四名ノ兵隊ノ所ヘ行キ、目隠ヲシテ欲シイカト尋ネタガ、彼等ハ断ツタ。一人ハ天主教。一人ハ英國聖公會。二人ノ英人牧師、即チ軍僧副部長、イス、フライアン、師ト「ワトソン」神父トハ四人ト話スコトヲ訴セタ。一人宛ニ合間程訴セタ。其處ニ天主教ノ信徒ハ一人モ居ナカッタデ「ワトソン」神父ハ度ッテ来タ。「ルイス、フライアン」ハ四人ト共ニ祈ヲ捧ゲ、ソレカラ傍觀者ノ中ニ入ッタ。

No. 4
次イデ、印度軍兇惡隊ニ裝填ノ命令ガ下ヘラレタ。丁度其ノ時「ラマ」中尉カ四名ノ所ヘ行ツタ。確ニ同中尉ハ以前カラ「ゲイル」ヲ知ッテ居タシイ。何故ナラ彼ハ「ゲイル」ト握手ヲシタカラ。其ノ後同中尉ハ「ブレイン」ト握手シ「ソレカラ其ノ地ノ二人ト握手ヲシタガ、私ハ彼ガ「ゲイル」ト握手ヲシ行ツタ事ハヨク解ッテ居タ。彼ハ度ッテ来テ、「ゲイル」ノ向ヒノ發砲隊ノ第三番目ノ印度兵ニ其ノ役ヲ

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我々貴方其署名を以て命令せしむる署名を以て不貴方に英園で教育ヲ
受けるも若我々其署名を以て命令せしむる我々其しう履行する義務ヲ
有する。ト言ふ。彼ら然し其署名を以て命令せしむる皆爲すと思ふ。死刑にせしむる
ヲ見せしむるト言ふ。

我々貨物自動車亦以て命令せしむるバスススルア（移動ヲ監督する高層ヲ
テ行ふ）

アライントレス又裁判せしむる多分中人と裁判せしむる有無の
事其終限を以て計画し捕らる兵隊等其の彼等何等の形軍法會議ニ
附せしむる其當時軍法會議より其係性質負キハ何又無かつ。

全部隊にハウツスルア（移動は月夜を完了す。或はウツスルア）
英人部隊正規軍用通常ハウツス設備有る其ハ賣店食堂、故事
場及び收容設備有る居る其處ニ万六千餘名が入る。

九月三日指揮官達ハ日本軍本部に彼等ト更ニ協議ヲ進む爲呼ぶ。再
ニ彼等ハ何故我々彼等命令に従ふべきかと尋ね我々之ニ命令する書ヲ
以テ吳レニツト問ふ。此ニ對シ彼等否然レ之ニ命令アルト云ふ。然レ

我々我々任務ヲ履行すべし。又若し貴方カ之ヲ書キ捕トキ吳レニツト云ふ
ナシ。ハローニテ若し貴方カ之ヲ書キ捕トキ直我々ハ其レカ拘束
カチ有るト云ふ。之ノ間貴方如何に指令に従ふト思ハナシ。我々之ニ

彼等ハ我々我々帰る事ナシ。ソノ時ガ三日間我々ハカチ不佐ト屢會議
大佐ハ將幕僚等ヲ以テ同席ヲ常伴す。我々我々之ニ居るト如何に無益ナル
指摘せしむる。我々度々戦役ニ出征し我々聯合國ヲ以テ頃ハ大戰時ニ大勝ノ任

ヲ以テ我々ハ今彼等從ふ。ハ無益ナト思ふ。是れ非害者多シテ是レト言ふ
彼ハ又拒絶し我々彼等ト共ニ形式修テ協議シ然レ彼等ハ如何ナル形上
妥協を度更ニ考慮ス。ト拒否シ。

此ノ全期間中日本軍トノ協議トハ別ニ指揮官達ハ全ク絶

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同十、三會談より、スウエーデン、部隊、健康、重要、事業、ナリ
シ、タ、赤痢、ヤ、ダ、ナリ、ヤ、患者、数、増、シ、程、増、加、シ、此、儘、
状態、モ、暫、ク、續、キ、事、其、處、患者、大、多、數、死、意、味、重、キ、
ナ、リ、真、夜、中、頃、我、ハ、會、合、シ、人、命、救、助、セ、ル、為、此、會、合、セ、ル、
ヨ、リ、ト、云、フ、上、に、決、定、シ、其、決、定、見、テ、其、夜、に、床、に、
リ、

翌、早、朝、カ、カ、ハ、又、我、ハ、會、合、シ、来、リ、此、會、談、中、日、本、側、非、常、
困、リ、居、ル、ト、明、カ、ナ、リ、ソ、レ、我、ハ、昨、夜、決、定、シ、コ、ト、に、
書、式、修、正、ス、確、固、ラ、シ、會、合、シ、ス、カ、ス、ヤ、リ、ト、續、キ、要、求、シ、
ハ、コ、ト、大、將、會、合、シ、行、キ、後、刻、席、ヲ、来、會、合、シ、ス、ト、云、フ、
ハ、月、三、十、日、附、會、合、第、七、号、返、答、ヲ、求、メ、其、後、程、他、會、
合、書、ト、共、ニ、送、リ、来、リ、其、ニ、我、ハ、自、由、意、志、ヲ、著、名、ス、
ニ、書、キ、ナ、リ、此、書、式、各、信、属、著、名、ス、ト、會、合、シ、
右、會、合、モ、亦、月、三、十、日、附、會、合、第、七、号、ト、ナ、リ、其、明、カ、ナ、
策、デ、ア、ル、事、解、リ、居、タ、カ、爾、時、其、云、フ、事、ナ、リ、

「ホ、ル、ズ、大、佐、白、田、連、ハ、月、三、十、日、附、會、合、第、七、号、會、合、撤、
去、セ、ル、事、本、會、合、ニ、変、更、シ、タ、リ、ト、布、告、シ、我、ハ、又、以、前、第、
七、号、會、合、書、ト、寫、シ、作、製、シ、テ、貢、メ、又、其、ヲ、註、明、シ、テ、貢、メ、
「バ、ウ、ン、ス、ウ、エ、ア、ニ、居、ル、期、間、中、信、属、ニ、何、等、口、糧、給、
與、モ、許、サ、ズ、カ、ハ、フ、コ、ト、ハ、病、院、ニ、口、糧、ヲ、與、ヘ、ナ、リ、ナ、イ、ト、
命、ジ、タ、最、初、に、病、院、患、者、皆、ス、ウ、エ、ア、ニ、収、容、ス、ル、ヤ、
決、定、セ、リ、ガ、我、ハ、其、コ、ト、テ、抗、議、ヲ、申、シ、立、テ、タ、終、ニ、彼、モ、
病、院、其、儘、ニ、テ、置、ク、コ、ト、ヲ、許、シ、タ、ガ、病、院、へ、或、ハ、ス、ウ、エ、
ア、ニ、監、禁、サ、レ、テ、ナ、リ、信、属、ニ、食、糧、ヲ、以、下、次、頁、

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支給シテハエラト云フ命ヲ發シテ病院ハ日本司令官デ通譯ヲシテ
居タ英軍ノ「ジョージ」大尉ハ日本軍ノ命令ヲ改意ニ誤解シタリテ食
糧ヲ得ヌ。同大尉ハ病院ノ食物ヲ新嘉坡ニ送り返ス様ニト日本陸軍
セリ其ヲ誤解シテ、病院へ送ツテ了ヌ。彼ノ其ノ行為ニ対スル日本軍
ノ報ハ彼等ガ処刑ヲ考ヘテ中々事デアツタガ終ニ何事モ起ラナク
我々ニ其ノ書式ニ署名スル様ニト命スル日本軍ノ署名ノアル命令書日
ガ發セラレタリテ我々ハ續クテ種々ノ形式ヲ命ジヌ。余ハ濠洲軍指揮官
トシテ事情上「ノールム」大佐ノ斯クセヨトノ命令ヲ度諾スル事ガ出来ズ
従ッテ濠洲軍ハ此ノ書式ニ署名スベシト言フ自分ノ命令ヲ發シタリ
其ヲ行フ前ニ余ハ英連ニ話シテ交添ノ全貌ヲ説明シ日本軍
ニ察令ミ聞シテ考ヘテ亦ハサセタト言フ事ト事實モ余ニツテハ道念
的勝利デアルト言フ自分ノ意見ヲ述ベタリデアル。

ソレカウ彼等ハ我々ニ我々ノ正當ノ宿舎ヲ再ビ使用スル事ヲ許シタガ
翌日設備ノ相當ノ量ヲ取り去ツタ。ソレモ設備ハ全ク充分デアッタ
カウ設備ノ不ハ言ヘナク。

「ヤヤ利」收容所デ日本軍ノ給與ハシタ食料ハ決シテ充分デナカッタ。五四
三年昭和七年ノ中頃カウ減リ出シシテ實際ニ飢餓食料トナリ
徵發ニ依ッテ得タ金銭將校ノ俸給及ビ軍隊カラノ小額ノ金ヲ見ヒ
ソレニ我々自身ノ野炊ヲ作ラナカッタ。誰モソノ食物ヲ生キテ行ク
事ハ出来ナカッタ。私ノ例ヲ舉ゲアルト十五ストーンノ体重デアツタガ
一九四三年ハ九ストーンニ減度

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ニアタ。十六ストー、一人が四ストー半ニ減リ、例ヲ知ラザル。此ニ實際一般的デアリ。誰も啗少クトモ三令ノ一ニ体重が減リテ居タ。

軍醫ガ栄養不良、高トイフ、病気がデキタ。タノ者、脚氣ニ罹リ。又馬鈴薯、葉ヤ莖並ニ「エ」ト呼ブ草ヲ食ベネバナリナカ。此「エ」トイフ、ハ非常ニ纖維ノ多ク、難草デアリ。之ニ米ニ食ビ、ルニ比較的美味シ。ハ、内、纖維ニ爲ニ腸ニ相当ノ故降ヲ起シ。之ガ非常ニ胃病ヲ起シ。我々が取扱イタ、十二指腸潰瘍ノ多敷、ハ、食物ニ爲患ス。極度ノ栄養不良デアリ。レーガニ（玉蜀黍紅斑）患者モ多数アリタ。終ニハ我々、栄養不良特別病棟ニ約三百名ヲ收容シ。彼等、酷ク体重、減リタ。デアリタ。.....

食物ヲテ加ヘテ、生活状態、皮膚病、疥癬等、セキ皮膚病相繼シ生サセ。日本軍ニ我々ニ甚ク少量ノ藥品與ヘタ。一九四一三年ニ我々ニ、毎年「ロ」ヲ世具ニタカ金ノ不充分デアリ。彼等自分達モキニエ、又「ア」ニ「ロ」ヲ得ン。又或ハ他ノ医療品ヲ得ン。ハ、我々ニ諸。日本軍ガ降服トナリタ時我々、我々が何年モ欲シト言フテ居タ。ア「ロ」製造スル工場ヲ新嘉坡ニ発見シタ。彼等、我々ニ「ア」ト多ク米ヲ與ヘルコトガデキタ。ハ、自今ノ考ヘル。彼等ノ降服シタ際ニ彼等、供給量ハト羽年ノ正月ス。我々ニ「ア」ハ足ル米ガ貯藏ニアリタ。彼等、我々ニ「ア」ト與テ多ク與ヘルコトガデキタ

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このト私考へ。其、附近ニハ沢山アリ。

今年、三月頃迄、彼等自身軍隊、我々ヨリ遙ニ甚ク其糧食ヲ得テ居タ。然レ今年、三月以後ハ彼等、我々ト全ク同シ配給デアル。但シ日本兵、物ヲ買フツトガデキタガ我々、日本軍、酒保ヨリ外テ、物ヲ買ヘナカッタ。日本兵、新嘉坡ヘ行き島内金ガアビ食フコトガデキタデアル。

金貨質代食物、缺乏ガ我々、主ト困難デアル。我々、我々自身芋園ヲ始メタ。後ニ彼等、許可ヲ得テ、百三十三エーカーニ擴張シタ。我々、之ヲ整頓シ、區劃シタ。スルト其事情、イデニシタ。一九四三年、始メ又、一九四二年、終頭訪ネテ来る日本將軍一人ガ之ヲ見テ、宣傳ニ良キト由リ之ヲ取リテ、以テ後、彼等ガ之ヲ管理シタ。尤モ我々ガ技術顧問デアルガ。我々ガ植エタモノ、中ニ数干本、桑樹ガアル。其、實ガ使ヘル様ニナルト日本兵、全部之ヲ沒收シタ。我々、之ヲ病院用ニタケ作テ居ル。説明シタ。彼等、之ヲ日本兵ニ與ヘヨリ、ト將軍(軍令讀)ト命令ヲ出シタ。.....

我々ガ女子監獄地區(移ル迄)彼等、我々ニ對シテ收容設備ニ一般ニ相當ナモノデアリタ。時々、甚ク酷イコトアル。時、之ヲヤギ地ニ一万余以上モ居タトガリ、酷混合タ。

戒時期ニ、私自身、部隊ニ正規ニ普通中隊長事務軍經理倉庫ト兵隊各收容スルニシタ。コトヲ持テ、コトヲシタ。

我々、九百九十九名收容ニ居タ。一九四三年昭和二年四月初カ、部隊移動依り收容設備場所ヲ充テキタ。カソ、イ、ノ、ト、デアリタ。英國一人、將校ト家族ガ居タ家ニ我々、之ヲシテ、百五十八名入レ、ネバ、ノ、コトデアリタ。

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各人ハ僅カニ十八坪場所ヲ取リテカッタガ、横ニナル場所ハ
アツク、併シ其ノ家ノ普通料理場ハ役ニ立タナカッタ。吾々
立テ困難ノ料理デアツタ、彼等ハ炊爨臺車ノ様ナモノ何
モウレナカッタ。吾々ハ夫レヲ皆自分デカキモノトシテナカッタ。
日本人ハ吾々ニ食事道具モ料理ニ役立ツ物モ何も渡シテ
ウレナカッタ。然レ戰前永ク其処ニ居ツタ士官連ガ居テ
或物ガ何処ニアルカヲ知ラセテフレタ、デ吾々ハ其ヲ取ツテ
来ニ許可ヲ日本人カウ得タリ又ハ唯取ツテ来ニカッタ。
吾々が日本人カウ食事ヤ料理、道具ヲ世買ハウトシテモ、ソレガ
新嘉坡、何処ニアルカラ吾々が知ツテ居ルト云フコトガ出来
ナケレバ無駄デアツタ。捕虜組織カアツテ吾々が行ツテ物ヲ
ホメラレルコトニナツテ居タガ何一ツ給與サレナカッタ。
捕虜ハ皆「ヤンギ」監獄ト其ノ外側地域ニ集メラレタ。
監獄内、人数ハ五千八百人デアツタガ三千人ニ減ツタ。
同監獄ハ二百人、職員ハ五百五十人、要細要人ト五十人、改
洲人ヲ收容スル様ニ造ラレテ居タ。其ノ移動ハ一九四一年/昭和
十九年/五月ニ行ハレタ。吾々ハ日本人、為ニ「ヤンギ」ニ飛
行場ヲ作ツタ、デアツタ。飛行隊ハ捕虜ヲ一人モ入レナイ
或ル一定地域ガ全部ハ要テントイトイフ、デ捕虜ハ出ナケ
レナカッタ。若シ飛行場ニ対スル猛烈ト攻撃ガ行ハ
タナレバ吾々ハ立ッ隊ヲ失フコトデアラウ。併シ自分、考
テハ移動ハ軍ニ流血、別、一倒ニ遇キナカッタモノと思フ
其ノ移動デアツタコトハ彼等ガ一般人、抑留者ヲ監
獄カウ出シラコトデ吾々ハ其ノ為ニ移動ヲ大受ナレタ

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一般、抑留者、三、四千人居ツテ其内一千以上の女子ヲ
アツタ。之等、婦人ハ監獄、一部ニ監禁サレ、数ヶ月間
監獄カラ出ルコトヲ許サシメカッタ。其、後彼等ハ泳ギニ
監獄カラ出ルコトヲ許サシメ、彼等、生活狀態ハ改善
ベキモデアッタ。吾々ハ其、移動ヲ大度ニシタ。何故ナ
レバ夫ハ彼等ガ新嘉坡、他、良イ所ヘ移轉スルコ
トヲ希望シタカラデアリ。

二年間、日本人ハ吾々ニ靴モツテ居ルヲ持ツテ居ル靴ヲ直ス
物モツテカッタ、其、後彼等ハ吾々ノ靴ヲ直シテワレルコトニ決メ
タガ、吾々ハ彼等ガ修繕ニツイテ吾々ニ照ラリレト西文来リタ。彼等
ハ暫クソウシタリ、尤モ目重ハ決ニテ充分デナカッタ。後ニツイテ、
彼等ハ吾々ノ為ニ靴ヲ修繕サセルコトニキメタ。其、為ニハ、彼等ハ
新嘉坡デ彼等ノ為ニ働ク原住民ヲ幾人、雇ハネバナラナカッタ。
之等ノ者が捕虜ノ靴ヲ修繕シテ居タト云フ事、實ニ宣傳ヲ幾
ラウ言ヒテ居タ。暫ク、同、彼等ハ吾々ニ修繕ノ靴、彼等ニ渡
ス様ニサセタガ、修繕ニ出シタ靴ガ十介、一返リ、モツカッタデ、
修繕ニ出グズニ自分デタイヤ、ノゴム、ト現地製モノ、ゴムデ直
ストニキメタ。之デ我々ハ靴ヲ修繕シタ。彼等、日本ガ靴ヲ配
給タガ、千人ニ足モ当ラナイ位デッタ。一九四二年、昭和十八年、
半年ト九四年、昭和十九年、元年、働キ出者千人中
九人、收容所ヲ吾々が自分デ作ッタ下駄ヲハキテ居タ。降伏シタ時、
彼等ハ又ニ足ツ当ル程靴ヲ配給タガ、大キガ合ナカッタ。比、日本
製、ハキ靴デッタ。

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我々八月十六日一人三付、最小限一枚、肌衣ト一着、日本製半ズボン、支給。依テ十分衣服を有シタガ、ソレ以前、年月中、彼等、少モ無イト云フヤデアル。

彼等ハ何時モ我々ニ帽子ヲ呉レルト約束シタガ、呉ル事ハ成モナカシタ。戦終ルモ、我々、彼等ガ、保管ニサリ我々、軍需品中カラ、カーキ色、訓練帽ヲ支給出来タ、デアルガ、給ニ呉リナカシタ。終戦後日本軍ハ靴半ズボン、肌衣及ビ若干、英國型、帽子ヲ支給シタ。我々ニトテ、最も大事ニ任事ハ、日本兵ニ依テ地均ト稱サレル作業デアル。イクタクモ、飛行場、外觀ヲ呈シタ。其ハ、三哩カラ三哩ノ行軍ト九時間ノ労働ガ、モデアル。兵隊ハ、通常、十時間、十一時間、出タ、試アル。作業監督者ハ、朝鮮人デアル。日本人デアル。彼等ハ、特ニ苛酷デ、非常ニ残忍シタ。此、吹ハ、有テ將軍ガ責任者デアル。

虐待時間、長イト又作業、困難ト事、理由ナシ陳情ニ及ビ、結果、少許ノ楽シタ。其ハ、九一年ニ要スル連續的ニ任事ナシ、故、最大ニ知リタ。當時我々ハ、靴モ衣服モ無カシタ。我々ハ、病院ニ居ル諸役、何デモ屋内、任事ヲシ、ナル者カラ靴ヲ全部、敬集セ、ネバラスト云フ状態ニ立ケ列ビサタ。ソレニ依テ、戶外作業ニ就ク人々、兎ニ角、ソノ中、若干ハ靴ガハケル事ニナリタ。今年、一月カラ、又、隊トシ、知ラキナル隊全隊、人員ハ、新嘉坡全域ニ亘

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ツテ配分サレ、其中、デノ、首都、デノ、二個隊ハ、日本軍、堡壘名、堀リニ使役サレ、若干、收容所ニハ、俘虜ハ、一日、十四時間モ働イタ。余ハ、其等、收容所ニ関シ、何、情報モ提供スル事ハ、出

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来。自命、後ニ提供ヲ受ケ、口頭及ビ書類報告カラ引用シテ
又デアル。一九四二年（昭和十七年）三月初旬、アラクノ所ト呼ビ
所ヘ行ツタ割、一隊ガアツタ。其、隊員ハ、大隊「不」キ
少佐、指揮下ニ在リ、降伏迄同所ニ居ツタ。彼等ハ最初
、一年間乃至ハ十六ヶ月間、非常ニ難儀シタデアルカ、之
亦、自命自身ノ知識カラ引用スル事ハ出来ナイ此矣不キ
少佐ガ、貴方、助ケトナリ得ル事ト提言シテ思ヒマス。
彼等ハ、彈丸運ビトシ、集積ラヤツテ居タ。ソノ收容所チ
一名ガ溺死シタ。

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余ハ飛行場が建造せし時、同飛行場ヲ使用スル日本、陸軍機ヲ見タ。

我々、福利ヲ為ヘテ受ルル訪問者ハ一人モナカッタ。高級將校ノ視察ハ随分少シタガ、我々が話シ掛ケテモヨイ人ハ一人モナカッタ。万国赤十字社代表、訪問モナカッタ。我々ハ繰返シ請願シタガ、何一ツ爲サレナカッタ。一九四二年ノ昭和十七年ノ、初メ母國ノ赤十字社代表が万国赤十字社派遣員「ジュウイツ」氏ト談合シ、赤十字入会、目的ヲ立寄金制ノ取極メ、爲、妙嘉坡ヘ移リテが許答サレタ。

但此、許可ハ一九四三年末ニ撤回サレタ。我々が同所へ着イタ日カラ、万国赤十字社派遣員ニ收容所ヲ訪問シテ見ル様、セウタレタアッタ。余ハ最後迄此、要求ヲ續ケタ。デアルガ答シテナカッタ。其ノ後、自命ハ「ジュウイツ」氏ト語り合ッタガ、同氏ハ自身が監視下ニアリ、緩カキ模面ヲ張ラシタト云ツテ居ン。

日本兵ハ我々、半、或ル数、若シ働ケルヲ要求シタ。

陳情ニ依ツテ望ミ、得ル日取上ノ事ハ人数ノ良デノ妥協デアッタ。其ノ爲、屢々適宜ナ連中ヲ日本軍ノ爲メ付クニ派シ、ソレヨリ不適宜ナ者ヲ收容所内ノ住メニ出セル必要ガ往々ニレタアッタ。例ヘバ、日本兵ハ料理人ナドハ必要ナトモ辛イ仕事ヲスル者ナトモ決シテ考ヘズ、最初、三年間ハ長イ間、料理ヲ仕事ト認メナカッタ。我々、シタハ、次ノ機ナリ、ツマリ中隊事務室要員及ビ軽任務要員ヲスダリ出シ、其等ノ者ヲ作業ニ就ケタデアル。遂ニ

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我々ハ收容所内デ働イテイル者一人残ラス。事實上、作業ニ不通
當トナリ、作業ヲ續行スルハ、割合ハ、段々ト其、作業ニ不
通ナ。程度ニ迄低下シタ、デアッタ。併シ、我々ハ、病人ハ我々
ノ監督下ニ働カセ、他、者達ヲ戶外勞役ニ就カセタイト考ヘテ
居タ。日本軍ノ命令ニ依リ、病人ハ收容所内デ働イテ居
タ。事實、日本兵ハ病人ヲ收容所内デ働セツケトハ果シ得
ナイ數、勞働要求ヲセシタ、デアッタ。(次頁ニ續ク)

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此、事ヲ日本兵ニ説明スル時ニ余ハ收容所内ニ作業。
適当ナ者ハ居ナイト云フヲ常トシ、不十分ナ給與ト與ヘシタ
此、生活條件デ、労働ハ協約違反有デアル旨ヲ指摘シタ。
余ハ是等、場合ニ於ケル陳情ヲ一切ヤツテノケタ。自分ハ戦
争ガ終了シタ時ニ我々ハ是、凡テヲモ心得ヌト曰フ常ニ
日本兵ニ警告告シテ居タ。

我々ハ誰モ作業ニ適スルモノハ居ナイ事ヲ主張シタ。
俘虏ト死傷者、名簿ガ最初、六週間前後、間ニ日本軍
ニ提出サレタ。

名簿ハ余自身、指図ニ依テ、一度日本軍ニ提出サレシ
デアル。他、折ニ彼等、司令部時通譯ヲヤツテ居タト
トスレ大尉ガ東京ヘ送ニシテ事ニナリ。俘虏及死傷者
別ニ、名簿一組ヲ携行シタ。其、後余、電話デ同氏ト
話シ、同氏ハ東京ニ名簿ヲ届ケタト述べ一同ガ豪洲ヘ
帰ツタカドウカト訊ネタ。時々日本兵ハ常ニ務トシテ我々
死傷者ニ就テ、通告ヲ受ケタノデアル。

全期百中、我々ハ二十五字内、葉書ヲ四通出ス事ヲ許可
サレタ。最後ハ、今年、六月カ七月デアッタ。其、以豪
洲兵俘虏ハ一九四三年／昭和十八年／中ニ一度故郷ヘ
便リヲ放送スル事ガ許サレタ。当時余、下ニ一萬人、俘
虜ガ居リ、一萬人全数、通信ヲ一遍ニ同時ニ送ルヤウニ
要請サレタ。ソ、結果ハ日本軍ガ四ヶ所、放送局ヲ
使用シタモ拘ラズ豪洲ニ居ル家族ハ或ル場合ニ、實際
ニ放送サレタ日、九ヶ月前ニ死ニテシマッタ。親子兄弟等

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俘虜ノ傳言ヲ耳ニシタルデアル。日本軍ハソノ通信ヲ送ル
ニ十八ヶ月ヲ要シタルデアッタ
余ノ送ッタ四五通ノ通信文ノ中、家族ノ受取ッタハ
二通デアッタ。

私、個人トシテハ濠洲ヨリ五一通ノ書信ヲ受理シタ。人ニ
ヨリテハモット良イ者モアリ又全然受ケテキナイ者モ數アッタ。
日本軍ノ郵便物受理を送ノ全組織ハ我慢ノナラヌ代物デアッタ
我々ハ朝鮮其ノ他ニ居ル人々宛ノ手紙ヲ受理シタガ該地ノ人々モ
我々ノ手紙ヲ受取ッテナルニ違ヒナカッタ。英國兵、濠洲兵俘虜
宛ノ最初ノ郵便物が新嘉坡ニ來タ。ソコデ我々ハ賴デ其ノ郵
便物ヲ適當ニ束ニ分類スル事ノ許可ヲ得タ。ソシテ、其等ヲ
日本軍ニ渡シ配達シテ貰フ事ニシタルデアアル。

我々郵便物ヲ「E. B. T.」ト署名シ宛ト夫々束ニシタ。我々ハ行先ヲ示
シタ附箋ヲ前部ニ貼附シタガ、矢張り、一九四五年（昭和二十年）
ニハ若干郵便物ノ束が歸ッテ來タ。日本軍ノ配達組織ハ、
全ク絶望的ナモノデアッタ。

今年ノ七月ニ、坂垣が出來タガ之ハコレヲナシタ最初デ唯一ノ日本
人デアッタ。坂垣ハ病院ヲ參觀シタ。彼ハ實際ニ、道路ノ角ニ立
チ止リ、病院ヲ指シ示サレタルデアアル。日本兵ハ俘虜將校團ヲ
整列サセ、余ハ何カ話スルガ出來ルカト云フ希望ヲ持ッテ二
名乃至三名ノ將校ノ間ニ這入ッタデアアル。

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